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continue until future case law refines and elaborates on that which the




Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers'
Carbon Fuel Company and the United Mine Workers of America
(UMW) were parties to the National Coal Wage Agreements of 1968 and
1971. These collective bargaining agreements contained an implied no-
strike clause in the form of an agreement to settle all disputes through arbi-
tration. 2 The agreements also contained mutual promises to "maintain the
integrity of the contract."3
In violation of the agreements, three local unions within UMW District
17 engaged in forty-eight unauthorized or wildcat strikes during the con-
tract term. 4 All members of the local unions participated in the strikes.'
District 17 and the International (UMW) apparently made good faith ef-
forts to induce the members to return to work; they did not, however, take
disciplinary action against any of the participants. 6
Carbon Fuel Company, an employer of members of the three locals,
filed suit in federal district court under the Labor Management Relations
Act 7 seeking injunctive relief and damages. The three local unions, Dis-
trict 17, and the International were named as defendants. 8 The district
court entered judgments against all three union defendants. Damages
1. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
2. In finding an implied no-strike clause in another bargaining agreement,
the United States Supreme Court explained: "[A] strike to settle a dispute which a
collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally
by compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement." Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
3. 444 U.S. at 216.
4. Seventeen of the 48 strikes were sympathy strikes which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held were not in violation of the implied
no-strike clause, applying the rationale of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). See note 11 infra.
5. 444 U.S. at 214 n.1.
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
8. 444 U.S. at 214.
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were awarded, but no injunctions were issued.9 In affirming the liability of
the local unions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
applied the "mass action"' 0 theory, which imputes liability to unions where
large numbers of members have acted in concert with or without authori-
zation. The damage award against the three locals, however, was re-
duced.1 1 The court of appeals vacated the judgments against District 17
and the International. 12
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a con-
flict among the federal courts of appeals over the standard for vicarious
union liability in breach of contract actions under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act). 13 The Fourth
Circuit, in Carbon Fuel, applied the common law standard for agency in
determining the liability of District 17 and the International. 14 The United
9. Jury verdicts aggregated $206,547.80 against the International,
$242,103.80 against District 17, and $722,347.43 against the local unions. Car-
bon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 582 F.2d 1346, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 212
(1979). Injunctive relief was denied because the contracts had expired by the date
of judgment entry. 444 U.S. at 214 n.2.
10. "The premise [of the mass action theory] is that large groups of men do
not act collectively without leadership and that a functioning union must be held
responsible for the mass action of its members." Eazor Express, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 935 (1976). See also United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1074
(3d Cir. 1976); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 456
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971); Adley Express Co. v. Highway
Truck Drivers Local 107, 365 F. Supp. 769, 777-78 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United
States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
11. The reduction was ordered because 17 of the strikes were sympathy
strikes. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 582 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd,
444 U.S. 212 (1979). Sympathy strikes generally are not a subject for arbitration.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1976). While
sympathy strikes may violate an express no-strike clause, they do not violate an
implied no-strike clause created by a compulsory arbitration clause because they
do not constitute a dispute between the parties to the contract. In reaching this
conclusion the United States Supreme Court said, "[A] no-strike agreement is not
to be implied beyond the area which it has been agreed will be exclusively covered
by compulsory terminal arbitration." Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 106 (1962).
12. 582 F.2d at 1351.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
14. 582 F.2d at 1351. Under the common law agency standard, the court
would have imposed liability only if a union had "adopted, encouraged or pro-
longed the continuance of the strike." Id. (quoting United Constr. Workers v.
Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78 (4th Cir. 1955)). Prior to Carbon Fuel,
several courts of appeals had adopted the common law agency standards. See
United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78 (4th Cir.
1981] 243
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously had applied the
"best efforts" standard in Eazor Express, Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 15 imposing liability for a union's failure to use
every reasonable means to end unauthorized strikes.
After analyzing congressional intent as found in the statutory lan-
guage, 16 legislative history, 7 and Supreme Court precedent,' 8 the Court
determined that the common law agency as applied by the Fourth Circuit
was to be used to determine vicarious union liability in section 301 actions.
Since the strikes in question had not been authorized, the local unions'
conduct was not within the scope of their agency. Therefore, neither Dis-
trict 17 nor the International was liable for the local unions' acts. Further-
more, the Court rejected the notion that the congressional policy favoring
arbitration created a union duty to use reasonable means to end wildcat
strikes.19 The Court also rejected the company's contention that UMW
had a duty to attempt to end wildcat strikes because of its commitment in
the collective bargaining agreements to "maintain the integrity of the con-
tract."
20
1955); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1975);
Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 876 (1977); Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 165
(7th Cir. 1972).
15. 520 F.2d 951, 965-66 (3d Cir. 1975). Other courts have applied this
standard as well. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974); 12th & L Ltd. Part-
nership v. Local 99-99A, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 396 F. Supp. 1174,
1177 (D.D.C. 1975).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) provides in part:
(b) ... Any labor organization which represents employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be
bound by the acts of its agents ....
(e) ... For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling.
17. The Court cited Senator Taft's explanation of § 301(e) as requiring
"legal proof of agency" in order to hold a union liable. 444 U.S. at 217. See 93
CONG. REC. 4022 (1947).
18. The Supreme Court applied the common law agency standard to unions
prior to passage of the Labor Management Relations Act. See Coronado Coal Co.
v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925).
19. 444 U.S. at 218.
20. Id. at 218-22. The Court considered the parties' bargaining history in
interpreting this phrase. In the 1950 contract, the parties agreed to use their "best
244 [Vol. 46
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The Carbon Fuel decision applied specifically to the liability of an in-
ternational union and a regional district union, not to the liability of the
local unions involved. 2' Nevertheless, the statutory language and the legis-
lative history are not so limited; they apply to all labor organizations. 22
This raises the problem of who, if anyone, may be held liable for damages
resulting from wildcat strikes if there is no legal proof of agency. Carbon
Fuel underscores this problem by limiting union liability while failing to
determine who shall be liable outside the newly specified limits.
In the early twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided the Danbury Hatters Cases.23 These cases revolved around a strike
and accompanying primary and secondary boycotts which were found to
be a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. 24 In the last of these cases,
Lawler v. Loewe, 2 1 the Court found that the union members, not the
union itself, 6 were jointly liable for the treble damage judgment. In order
to satisfy the award, many union members' homes were levied upon and
taken in satisfaction of the judgment. 2
In the 1940s when Congress formulated the Taft-Hartley Act, avoid-
ance of the Danbury Hatters result was a principal reason for creating
union liability under the Act. 28 Section 301 stated that a union could sue or
be sued as an entity and that judgments against a union could not be en-
forced against individual members. 29 In a 1962 case, Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co. ,30 the Supreme Court considered union liability in conjunc-
tion with individual liability in order to construe section 301. The Court
decided that when a union was liable in a section 301 suit, individual union
members did not incur liability even if they were named as defendants in
separate counts. The Court declined to decide whether individual mem-
efforts" to avoid work stoppages. The union negotiated the deletion of that phrase
in the 1952 contract. The 1952 language was carried forward, essentially un-
changed, into the 1968 and 1971 agreements. Id.
21. Id. at 215 n.3. Review of the judgments against the local unions, af-
firmed but reduced by the Fourth Circuit, was not sought. Id.
22. No distinction is made between local, district, and international unions
in § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). For
pertinent portions of this section, see note 16 supra.
23. Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), on remand, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir.
1913), aff'd, 235 U.S. 522 (1915). See also Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d
Cir. 1916).
24. 235 U.S. at 534. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
25. 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
26. Id. at 535-36.
27. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452
F.2d 49, 52 n.5 (7th Cir. 1971).
28. See 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
30. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
1981]
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bers could be held liable for damages in a section 301 suit when a union
was not held liable.3 '
Thus the development of the law had not only experienced a shift away
from the Danbury Hatters result, but had developed a steady trend to im-
pose liability on the union to the exclusion of the individual members. The
Supreme Court refocused this trend in Carbon Fuel, construing section
301 to limit union liability. The unresolved question is who will be liable
when the union is not. Two conflicting lines of authority have developed
on this issue.
In Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers,32 union members were
held liable for breach of an implied no-strike agreement where the union
could not be held liable. The court was unable to find sufficient proof of
agency to support liability against either the international or the localA3
The federal district court rejected the "mass action" theory followed by the
Fourth Circuit in Carbon Fuel.3 4 Individual member liability was based in-
stead on the court's interpretation of three Supreme Court cases, Atkin-
son,35 Smith v. Evening News Association,36 and Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc.3 7 Smith and Hines permitted individual union members to
assert section 301 actions against employers for breach of collective bar-
gaining agreements. Both cases contained dicta supporting the proposi-
tion that employers also have a cause. of action under section 301 against
individual union members. 8 The Alloy Cast Steel court referred to the
dicta in both Smith and Hines as holdings in favor of individual union
member liability. The court then said that it was "not foreclosed from
hearing and deciding whether the individual members violated the con-
tract, " 39 and proceeded to hold individual members liable for violation of
the no-strike clause of a collective bargaining agreement.
31. Id. at 249 n.7.
32. 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
33. Id. at 450.
34. The district court rejected the mass action theory on the basis of Sixth
Circuit precedent in Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Unions 1734, 1508, 1548, UMW,
543 F.2d 10,12 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
35. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
36. 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (individual employees may bring § 301 damage ac-
tions against employers for breach of collective bargaining agreements).
37. 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (individual employees may bring § 301 damage ac-
tion against employer for wrongful discharge).
38. The Smith dicta cited Atkinson for support. 371 U.S. at 199-200. This
reliance was unjustified since the Atkinson Court explicitly refused to decide the
issue of individual liability. 370 U.S. at 249 n.7. The dicta in Hines baldly stated
that § 301 contemplated suits both by and against individuals, followed by a sup-
ported discussion of only the rights of individuals to sue their employers. 424 U.S.
at 562.
39. 429 F. Supp. at 451.
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A similar result was reached in DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters.40 Individual union members' liability was
supported under an agency theory: union officers entered into contracts as
agents for the membership and the individual members became bound as
principals when they ratified the contract. 41 The federal district court con-
cluded, however, that individual members should be held liable for breach
of the contract only when "acting solely and only in their own behalf and
not in the behalf of the union or in furtherance of any union plan. '42
New York State United Teachers v. Thompson43 also allowed an em-
ployer to proceed to judgment on a section 301 damage action against
employees for breach of contract. The court relied on the broad public
policy of promoting "a high degree of responsibility upon the parties to
such .. .[a contract to] thereby promote industrial peace" 44 as the ra-
tionale for conferring liability on individual union members.
Other federal courts have adopted the contrary position, finding that
individual union members may not be held liable for breach of contract
under section 301 .4 A case heavily relied on by these courts is Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union.4 6 Sin-
clair Oil undertook an extensive analysis of congressional intent as derived
from the legislative history of section 301. The court found that one of
Congress' principal concerns in creating union liability under section 301
was "to avoid subjecting individual union members to fiscal ruin that was
visited upon members as a result of the 'Danbury Hatters' decision." 47
Reference was made to congressional committee reports which discussed
only suits by and against unions as entities. 4 8 This limitation, however, had
40. 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
41. The federal district court wrote:
The individual union members by their membership in the union have
given their officers the power and authority to negotiate and to enter into
contracts with employers, subject to their ratification. When such ratifi-
cation is given by the union members, then it becomes a valid and bind-
ing contract not only upon the union but also upon the individual mem-
bers of that union.
Id. at 1233.
42. Id.
43. 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
44. Id. at 684.
45. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Local 5, Indus. Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers, 469 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir. 1972); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49, 52-54 (7th Cir. 1971);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Adley Express Co. v. High-
way Truck Drivers Local 107, 365 F. Supp. 769, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
46. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 52.
48. Id. at 52-53.
1981] 247
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already been exceeded by the Supreme Court in Smith, which allowed sec-
tion 301 suits by employees as well as by unions. 49 During Senate debate on
the Taft-Hartley Act, individual liability for wildcat strikes was discussed.
The liability referred to, however, involved union fines. 50 Congress also
discussed discharge and discipline as remedies for wildcat strikes, but these
remedies were not enacted into law. 5' The court in Sinclair Oil concluded
that while Congress showed "a concern for the promotion of industrial
peace through making unions liable for breaches of their bargaining
agreements, ' '5 2 it "did consider the consequences of imposing financial
responsibility on union members who engaged in non-tortious un-
protected concerted activity as union members, in breach of a no-strike
clause and rejected it. ' '15
The two conflicting theories both are based on public policy argu-
ments. The argument for individual member liability demands a remedy
in damages as necessary to promote industrial peace. The argument
against individual member liability relies on the protection of individuals
from fiscal ruin 4 allied with the remedies of injunction, discharge and
discipline, and union fines to promote industrial peace. Both positions
claim the support of congressional intent: one inferred from statutory
silence, the other derived from legislative debate.
At present, the best protection for both unions and employers, until
the United States Supreme Court addresses and decides this issue, is the
alternative provided in Carbon Fuel: free collective bargaining. If the par-
ties negotiate and decide among themselves when union liability shall be
incurred and how wildcat strikes shall be handled, their intentions should
49. See 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
50. 452 F.2d at 53; 92 CONG. REC. 5706-07 (1946).
51. 452 F.2d at 53 n.9.
52. Id. at 53.
53. Id. at 54. In Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 967, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Sinclair Oil to buttress its argument for
the "best efforts" standard which was not imposed by the Supreme Court in Car-
bon Fuel; 444 U.S. at 218. According to the Eazor Express court, the combina-
tion of an agency standard of liability for unions and the holding in Sinclair Oil
would in many instances "leave the plaintiffs without any remedy in damages if
... the individual union members are not answerable for illegal strike activity."
520 F.2d at 967.
The court in Sinclair Oil also had dismissed state law claims against individual
union members because of federal preemption. 452 F.2d at 55. See Avco Corp. v.
Arco Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962).
54. The protection against fiscal ruin argument influenced Congress in ap-
plying the common law agency standard to unions. See'text accompanying notes
28 & 47 supra.
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